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On July 12, 1914 Ambassador Count Laslo Szögyény reported from Berlin that everyone in the German government wanted to see Austria-Hungary declare war on Serbia at once, and were tired of Austrian indecision about whether to choose war or peace.  He added that this:

… insistence on a war against Serbia was based on the two considerations already mentioned; firstly that Russia and France were ‘not yet ready’ and secondly that Britain will not at this juncture intervene in a war which breaks out over a Balkan state, even if this should lead to a conflict with Russia, possibly also France…. Not only have Anglo-German relations so improved that Germany feels that she need no longer feel fear a directly hostile attitude by Britain, but above all, Britain at this moment is anything but anxious for war, and has no wish whatever to pull chestnuts out of the fire for Serbia, or in the last instance, Russia…. In general, then, it appears from all this that the political constellation is as favourable for us as it could possibly be.”.

On July 12, Austrian Foreign Minister Berchtold had shown German Ambassador Tschirschky the contents of his ultimatum containing “unacceptable demands”, and promised to present it to the Serbs after the Franco-Russian summit between President Poincaré and Nicholas II was over.  Wilhelm wrote on the margins of Tschirschky’s dispatch “What a pity!” that the ultimatum would be presented so late in July.